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Judicial
Highlights:

Maryland
by Arthur M. Frank

CRIMINAL LAW - Rightto a Speedy
Trial
In Epps v. State, No. 236, Term 1974,
the Maryland Court of Appeals freed a
defendant who was convicted two years
ago of robbery with a deadly weapon
because he had been denied a speedv
trial as guaranteed by federal and state
constitutions. Judge O'Donnell held
that "a delay in affording a criminal defendant a "speedy tria\' because of overcrowded dockets and scheduling problems, the responsibility for which rests
upon both courts and prosecutors, cannot be classified as wholly 'neutral' and
must be included within the period of
delay in determining whether there has
been a denial of this constitutional
right."
Mr. Epps, arrested in August of 1972,
was not tried until August of 1973. Alibi
witnesses were unavailable to testify as a
result of the delay. The Cause of delay
included the illness of the arresting officer and lack of available jury dates. Mr.
Epps did not even want a jury triat; however, the state wanted to jointly try the
present defendant with two other codefendants.
This was the first case in which the
Court of Appeals of Maryland ordered a
criminal defendant free since the United
States Supreme Court, in Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), set out a
balancing test (in which the conduct of
both the prosecution and the defendant
are weighed) to determine whether a
speedy trial has been denied allOWing
one to go "absolutely" free. The court
in Barker v. Wingo rejected the
"demand-waive" rule as being too rigid.
Justice Powell outlined four factors to

consider in this balancing process:
1. Length of delay,
2. Reason for the delay,
3. The defendant's assertion of his
right, and
4. Prejudice to the defendant, in
order to:
a. prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration,
b. minimize anxiety and concern
of the accused, and
c. limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.
The Court of Appeals for Maryland is
to be commended for its well-reasoned
opinion. The court took proper cognizance of the Fifth Ammendment: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public
tria\." It should be noted that in Barker v.
Wingo, the Supreme Court held that
Barker was not deprived of his due process right to a speedy tria\. The Supreme
Court could just not bear to let a "criminal" go free. In Barker v. Wingo, the
Court stated that length of delay is to be
considered, though five years was not
enough in that case; that the
"demand-waiver rule" was rejected, yet
held to be persuasive in Barker's case;
and that cause of delay is significant, but
not considering that the state has the
burden of bringing the accused to trial in
a speedy manner.
The Maryland courts are not bound
by U.S. Supreme Court standards (at
least how that Court applies them) to the
letter, as long as they give substantial
due process as defined by that Court.
But Maryland may maintain stricter
standards to insure the accused
"adequate" due process (more than
"substantial"?) And it seems that Maryland, as shown by Epps is broadening
the due process right to a speedy tria\.

EVIDENCE - Impeachment of Witness
In Yowell v. State, No. 18, Term
1975 - filed October 3, 1975, the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
held that "refusal to permit crossexamination based on witness' alleged
prior inconsistent statement foreclosed
the trial tactic of impeachment and de-

nied the Appellant a fair and impartial
tria\."
Michael Dale Yowell was convicted of
rape, assault and perverted sexual practice by a jury. At trial, defense counsel
showed the prosecutrix a statement she
made earlier to a public defender's investigator on cross-examination. The
court refused to allow crossexamination as to the alleged prior inconsistent statement in the report because the statement was not given under
oath.
The Court of Special Appeals held the
substantive issue was procedurally before the court in light of Maryland Rule
1085 (review being limited to questions
decided by the lower court), since the
defense did make an effort to lay a foundation for impeachment, but was frustrated in making a proffer due to the
judge forbidding same because the
statement was not made under oath.
Turning to the substantive issue, the
court held that prior inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes need
not be under oath. "It is enough that the
statement, oral or in writing, be made
prior to the giving of the challenged testimony, and that it be material to the
facts at issue and not merely collateral or
irrelevant." The court noted its prior ruling in Sanders v. State, 1 Md. App. 630,
232 A.2d 555 (1967): "Provided a proper foundation has been laid, the credit
of a witness may be impeached by showing he has made statements which contradict his testimony in respect to material facts ... To lay the foundation for such
evidence, the witness must be first interrogated as to the time, place and person
to whom contradictory statements were
made." This was attempted by defense
counsel in the present case. The court
notes that in Sanders, nothing was mentioned to the effect that the prior inconsistent statement had to be under oath.
The present case now affirmatively extends Sanders to statements not made
under oath.
As a result of the judge's denial of the
use of the prior inconsistent statement,
Yowell was denied a fair and impartial
trial guaranteed under the United States
Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and therefore, the judgment was reversed.
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